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Sometime prior to April 26, 1949, the Respondent, 
Archie :b....,indlay, received a letter from his aunt, ~frs. 
Nancy E. Hirigaray, requesting that he come to Layton 
because she had son1e matters to take up with him. In 
response to this letter, Archie Findlay came to Layton, 
at which time he was advised that Mrs. Hirigaray wanted 
to convey her property to him. For this purpose, they 
went to the Barnes Banking Company in Farmington, 
Utah, where they talked ·with :Jlr. Gailey, who is now the 
president of said bank. After :Jirs. Hirigaray had ex-
plained to }Ir. Gailey 'vhat she desired to do, the record 
shows that he explained to her that in order to have a 
valid deed, it had to be delivered. Counsel for the Appel-
lant has attempted to imply that the deliver~~ may have 
been in trust for the benefit of others. ''7 e respectfully 
submit that this is not an issue before this Court. If, 
however, in fact, this "\\-'"as a delivery in trust, the Appel-
lant's case would still fail because the sole question before 
the Court is, to-wit: '';as there a valid delivery' A valid 
delivery c.an be n1ade in trust as "ill be 1nore fully set 
forth under Point I. 
~.,ron1 the transeript there can be no doubt but that 
a delivery of this deed did, in fact, take place. For ex-
ample, at page 28 of the transcript beginning at line 15, 
've find the follo,ving language by j\fr. Findlay while 
being cross-exa1nined by 1\fr. Hardy: 
Q. 'Vhat did she say again f 
A. She said she understood it. He said when 
you hand this deed to ~fr. Findlay, it is his. 
It is yours no longer, and she said she under-
stood i~t. 
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Q. After Mr. Gailey made that statement, what 
happened~ 
A. She gave it to me. 
Q. Did she give it to you personally~ 
A. Yes, Sir. 
At page 36 of the tr.anscript beginning at line 6 
when the witness, Mr. Gailey, was being cross-exa1nined 
by Mr. Hardy, he made the following statement: 
A. 'V ell, she asked me to draw up a deed. I 
fixed up the deed and she gave it to Mr. Hiri-
garay, not 1Iirigaray, to Arch Findlay and he 
.asked rrte to keep it for him, to file it away in the 
vault, which I promised to do. I explained to 
nirs. Hirigaray vvhen she gave the deed, I told her 
it was being delivered to Findlay ***. 
I explained to the1n that there couldn't be 
any strings attached to the deed. When it was 
delivered to 1\Ir. li..,indlay, it was his deed, and he 
handed it to me. vV e were holding it for safe-
keeping for him. It tuottlcln't be delivered to any-
one else than him, until it is ordered, ***. 
POINT I. 
THE SOLE QUESTION TO BE DECIDED IN DETER-
MINING THE V ALIDITI:- OF A DEED IS WHETHER OR 
NOT THE DEED WAS DELIVERED TO THE GRANTEE. 
THE FACT THAT THE GRANTOR REMAINS ON THE 
PREMISES, KEEPS IT INSURED, .COLLECTS THE RENT, 
PAYS THE TAXES AND EXERCISES ALL OTHER INCI-
DENTS OF O·WNERSHIP, HAS NO BEARING ON THE 
QUESTION OF A VALID DELIVERY. 
The case at hand appears to be on all fours 'vith the 
Utah case of Woolley v. Taylor, et al., 45 U. 227, 144 P. 
1094, (1914). In that case, the facts are as follows: 
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Shortly after acquiring the prop·erty, the purchaser 
moved on to the property where he continued to live 
with his daughter from that time until his death. lie had 
one son in addition to the daughter who lived on the 
premises with hint. He had drawn a deed conveying the 
property to his daughter, but the deed was not recorded 
until the day after hi~ death. Beginning on page 230, line 
12, we quote directly from that decision: 
"After his purchase, he talked 'vith the con-
veyancer and expressed an intention to give the 
property to his daughter, but to retain a life es-
tate, and expressed a wish to make a deed and 
'put it away' until he was dead, \Yhen his daughter 
could get it. The conveyancer informed him, such 
a deed would not be good and that : 
'Unless you deliver the deed, she can't 
get any title; you must deliver the deed to 
her now; then she can do .as she wants wit~ 
it-put it a\vay or destroy it or anything 
else.' 
"The father and daughter "~ere both present. 
The conveyancer thereupon dre'v a "'"arranty deed 
conveying the property to the daughter by the 
father. The father signed and aekno\vledged it 
and then in the presence of the conveyancer, 
handed it to his daughter. After that, ilnprove-
Inents "~ere n1ade on the property and \vere paid 
for b)· hin1. *** During all that tune the property 
was insured and a~sessed in his na1ne, and all 
insurance ~u1d taxt>s paid by hiln. *** lTnder such 
circuinsta.nres, the father liYing" on the premises 
and 1naking such pay1nents is not inconsistent 
'vith ownership of the property in her." 
rrhe Court "'"ent on to hold that the deed had, in 
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fact, been delivered to the daughter. 
This, we contend, is precisely what happened in the 
case at hand. lVIr. Gailey advised Mrs. Hirigaray that 
in order to rna.ke a conveyance legal and stand up in 
Court, it had to be delivered and it was delivered by 
the decedent to Archie Findlay, who, in turn, delivered 
it to Mr. Gailey to keep for him, and lVIr. Gailey testified 
that he would not have delivered it to any other person, 
but that it was being held by him for Mr. Findlay. 
There is absolutely no evidence in the record from 
which it could ever he inferred that the deed was not 
delivered. This is the one place where this case is dif-
ferent from all others where they have held that the 
delivery was not good. 1Tor example, in the case of 
First Security Bank of Utah v. Burgie, et ux., ______ Utah 
...... , 251 P. 2nd 297, which is the only case relied on by 
the Appellant in his Brief, there was definite conflict 
in the evidence as to the delivery of the deed. On the 
one hand, the proponents of a valid delivery testified 
that the deed and bill of sale were in the possession of the 
defendant grantee and that he kept them, along with 
other valuable papers, in a red chocolate box over his 
kitchen sink and that the deceased had made many 
statements to the effect that in case he should die, 
everything was taken care of. 
On the other hand, the record shows that irrnnedi-
ately upon grantor's death, the defendant grantee took 
possession of grantor's keys, stating that there was a 
deed in the vault which he intended to get and record as 
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soon as possible and refused to allow any witnesses to 
be present when he opened the hasernent vault. This, 
of course, strongly indicates that the deed had not been 
in the possession of the grantee but was, in fact, in the 
possession of the grantor in his safe and could only be 
obtained by use of the grantor's keys. In holding that 
the deed had not been delivered and was still in the 
possession of the grantor, the Court stated: 
"While upon an appeal of a case in equity, 
this Court may review the Findings of Fact as 
well as the Conclusions of La,,~; nevertheless, the 
findings of the trial Court will not be set aside 
unless it n1anifestly appears that the Court has 
misapplied proven facts or made findings clearly 
against the weight of the evidence. Gibbons v. 
Bryan, ______ U. ______ , 230 P. 2nd 983; Stanley v. 
Stanley, Supra, and cases cited therein. The 
record substantially supports the lower court's 
findings with respect to non-delivery of the 
deed and bill of sale." 
It is interesting to note that this ease ''Tas decided 
in the lower court by Judge Co,vley, the san1e judge be-
fore \vhoin the rase at hand "\Yas tried. 
\Ve strongly contend that had there not been a con-
flict in the Pvidence outlined above, the CouTt "\Yould not 
have sustained the lo"\ver courfs decision and the result 
would have been the other "\Yay and the .arts of O"\vner-
ship by the grantor "~ould not have been inconsistent "\Yith 
the holding of a valid deliYer~T· This conclusion 1nust 
follo"\v in the lig·ht of other decisions upon this sa1ne 
point in the State of Utah. 
The Woolley e.ase cited above is one good exrunple 
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on this point. To point up the problem even more clearly, 
let us take the ease of a delivery of a deed to .a third 
party, for delivery to the grantee after the de,ath of 
the grantor and not before. In this case, the grantee 
would not even be aware of the deed being in existence. 
The grantor "\vould obviously still go on exercising all 
of the acts of ownership such as p.aying taxes, keeping 
the property insured, collecting rents and stating to 
people it was his and yet the deed would be valid, pro-
viding he has plaeed the same beyond his control to recall 
it and in this ease at hand, ~{r. Gailey testified that he 
was holding the deed in s.afe keeping for Mr. Findlay and 
Mr. Findlay only. In the case of Singleton v. Kelly, et. 
al., 61 Utah 277, 212 P. 63, ( 1923), the Court quotes with 
favor from the California case of vVilliams v. Kidd, 170 
Cal. 631, 151 Pac. 1, as follows: 
"It is well settled that a person may make a 
conveyance of property and place it in the hands 
of a third party to be delivered to the grantee 
named in it on the death of the grantor and that 
such a delivery will be effectual to pass a present 
title to the property to the grantee, if the inten-
tion of the grantor is to make such delivery abso-
lute and place it beyond his power thereafter to 
revoke or control the deed." 
To the same effect, we have the case of Losee, et. ux. 
v. Jones, et. ux., 120 Utah 385, 235 P. 2nd 132, (1951). 
The mother drew up deeds to different parts of her 
property naming various of her children as grantees. 
The Court stated as follows: 
"The deeds were not delivered to the sons 
and daughter. However, were placed in a safe 
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deposit box in a bank by the mother. This box 
was one held by the ntother and one of her daugh-
ters jointly. Later on when quite ill, she had the 
deeds brought to her. She made a correction in 
one and executed another. She then handed all 
of the deeds to one of her daughters and in-
structed her to deliver them, after her death, to 
the named grantees. The daughter then placed 
the deeds in a bureau drawer in the same room 
where her mother w.as ill. After death, they were 
delivered. The daughter testified that had the 
mother requested the deeds, she would have given 
them back. The Court said: 
'Are these facts sufficient to constitute 
a delivery? In the case of Singleton v. Kelly, 
61 Utah 277, 212 Pac. 63, this Court approved 
the applicable principals \vhich had almost 
universally acceptance: That where a grantor 
executes a deed and places it in the hands 
of a third party for delivery after the death 
of the grantor, with the intent that the deed 
and its delivery are absolute, that the title 
in fact passes and the third p.arty then holdR 
the deed as trustee for the grantee.' '' 
Again in the case of Burnhan r. Eschler, 116 Utah 
61,209 P. 2nd 96, (1949), they state: 
~~That grantor, after the execution of deeds, 
continued to pay the taxes on the property, car-
ried insurance in her na1ne and expressed to 
various persons the desire to se II a part or all of 
the property is not, 1cheu the relatio-nBhip u·hic~ 
e.r-isted behreen the grantor and the grantee tS 
taken info cousiderafl~ou. ineonsistent \vith the 
actual deliverY of the deed ***. Nor \vas the 
finding of deli;'"er~~ by the Io,ver courts precluded 
hY the fnet. that nJrs. Schank chose to deliver the 
d~ed to a third part~,. instructing hin1 to deliver 
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the deed to the grantee after her death instead of 
delivering them directly herself to the grantee.'' 
It is interesting to note that the relationship which 
·was referred to in this case, was exactly the same as that 
which exists in the case at hand; i.e., aunt and nephew. 
Again in the ease of fJ7'ilson v. Wilson) 32 Utah 169, 
89 Pac. 443 ( 1907), where the father was about to re-
marry and he conveyed his property to his son, second 
wife attempted to have the conveyance set aside for lack 
of delivery in order that she could take her statutory 
one-third interest. The Court held that where a grantor 
delivers a deed to a third person absolutely as his deed, 
without reserration, and without intending to reserve 
any control over the instru1nent, though it is not to be 
delivered to the grantee until the grantor's death, the 
deed, when delivered, is valid and takes effect on the 
first delivery. 
To exactly the same affect is the case of Cappmayer) 
et. al. v. Wilkenson) et. al.J 53 Utah 236, 177 Pac. 763 
(1919). In this case deeds and mortgages were n1ade to 
grantor's children just before he remarried and he de-
liveTed them to the ·utah County Abstract c·ompany of 
Provo, Utah, with directions to deliver the deeds to 
grantees upon his death. The Court cited the Wilson v. 
Wilson case in sustaining the lower court's language: 
""\\tThere a grantor delivers a deed to a third 
person absolutely as his deed without reservation, 
and without intending to reserve any control over 
the instrument, though it is not to be delivered to 
the grantee until the grantor's death, the deed, 
when delivered, is valid and takes effect from 
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the first delivery." 
C~ase!s front other jurisdictions holding to the same 
rule of law are as follows: Cox v. McCartney, 34 Tenn. 
App. 235, 263 S.E. 2nd 763; Jobse v. U.S. National Bank 
of Portland, 142 Ore. 692, 21 P. 2nd 221; Jorgenson v. 
Jorgenson, 7 4 S.D. 239, 51 N.W. 2nd 632; Grouse v. 
H ousner, 322 Mich. 448, 34 N.W. 2nd 38; Burton v. Peace, 
206 N.C. 99, 173 S.E. 4; and Camp v. Guarantee Trust 
Company, 262 Mich. 223, 247 N.W. 162. 
POINT II. 
THERE IS A S'TRONG PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF 
A VALID DELIVER.Y WHERE IT IS RECORDED BY THE 
GRANTEE AFTER DEATH OF THE GRANTOR. ONE WHO 
WOULD OVERCOME THIS PRESUMPTION WHICH FLOWS 
FROM THE RECORDING THERE·OF HAS THE BURDEN 
OF PRODUCING COMPETENT EVIDEN·CE OF NON-
DELIVER.Y. 
At the trial only two witnesses \Vere called by the 
Appell1ant to prove their case; the Respondentt, Archie 
Findlay, and the president of the Barnes Banking Com-
pany, Mr. J. R. Gailey. Both of these witnesses testified 
that the deed was delivered by the deceased to ~fr. 
].,indlay who in turn delivered it to 1Ir. Gailey, \Vho held 
it at Mr. Findlay's direction. There has been no evidence 
'vha.tsoever introduced to the affect that there W'"as not a 
delivery but, at best, there has been son1e inference that 
the delivery was rnade in trust 'vhich, of course, as indi-
cated, is not an issue before the Court at this tiine. In 
the Utah case of Bertoch v. Gailey, et. a1., 116 Utah 101, 
208 P. 2nd 953, (1949), the Court sta~tes: 
''One 'vho 'vould overcorne presurnption of 
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delivery of deed, which flows from the recorda-
tion thereof, had burden of producing competent 
evidence of non-delivery or show a conditional 
delivery with the conditions unfulfilled, and mere 
avermenrt of non-delivery and offer of evidence 
which created so1ne suspicion, was insufficient to 
discharge that burden or impose upon the adver-
sary the burden of affirmatively proving .actual 
delivery.'' 
(Incidentally, this is the same J. R. Gailey involved 
in this case who is the principal witness in the case at 
hand.) 
In the case of Knighton v. ]1/fanning, et. al., 84 Utah 
1, 33 P. 2nd 401., (1934), 'rilda Larson and Oscar B. Berg-
lund lived together for ten years but were not married. 
Three days after death of 'J~ilda, Oscar recorded a deed 
to her property to hi1nself. The Court held that the deed 
being in his possession and properly executed by the de-
cedent, gave rise to a presurr1ption that there was a valid 
delivery and one attempting to prove otherwise had the 
burden of sustaining proof. Citing Chamberlin v. Larson, 
83 Utah 420, 29 P. 2nd 355, and Fish v. Poorman, 85 Kan. 
237, 116 P. 898, Jones v. Betz, 203 Iowa 767, and other 
eases. Also, recently in the Utah case of Morgan v. 
Sorenson, 3 Utah 2nd 428, 286 P. 2nd 229, (1955), the 
Court even went further and held that where a deed, 
executed and ackno-vvledged, is found in the hands of the 
grantee, its invalidity can he established only by clear 
and convincing evidence. 
The plaintiff has offered no evidence which would 
even tend to establish that the deed in question was not 
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actually and physically delivered. On the contrary, as 
pointed out, the only two witnesses called, both stated 
unequivocally that the deed was executed and delivered 
by the decedent to Archie Findlay, who in turn gave it to 
Mr. Gailey, who held it subject to Archie Findlay's 
order. We submit that the case at hand is much stronger 
than any ease previously argued before this Court and 
that the decision of the lower court should be sustained. 
POINT III. 
THE DEAD MAN'S STATUTE DOES NOT APPLY IN 
A SITUATION WHERE THERE IS A THIRD PARTY WIT-
NESS TO THE TRANSACTION WHO CAN SUBSTANTIATE 
THE PARTY WHO WOULD OTHERWISE BE DISQUALI-
FIED UNDER THIS LAW. 
It is extremely difficult for me in reading Section 
74-24-2 UCA (1953), to know just what class of witnesses 
the legislature intended to exclude unde-r the "Dead ~Ian" 
section of our code. The confusion, however, is ren1oved 
in the case of JJ;faxfield v. Sainsbury, 110 l~tah 280, 172 
P. 2nd 122, wherein they state: 
"The purpose of the statute is to guard 
against the temptation to give false testin1ony in 
regard to a transaction 'Yith a deceased person 
by the surviving party 'vhen the transaction is in-
volved in a la"~ suit and death has sealed the 
n1outh of the other party. Furthertnore, the 
statute seeks to put the t'Yo parties upon tern1s 
of equality in regard to giving evidence of the 
transaction. 3 tT ones ev. 790; ~Iiller v. Livingston, 
31 Utah 415, 88 P. 338. It "~as never intended that 
this section should be used for the purpose of 
surpressing the truth. On the eontrary~ the stat-
ute's sole purpose is to prevent the proving by 
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false testimony of claims against the estate of a 
deceased person." 
Peter M. Lowe, attorney for the estate, has objected 
to the testimony of ~1r.. Findlay pertaining to the con-
versations which took pl•ace at the time the deed in ques-
tion was executed and delivered and specifically to his 
testifying as to what Mr. Gailey stated at that time. It 
should be borne in mind that the witness was called by 
!:Ir. Lowe himself and on direct examination, all of these 
specific points were opened by him. For example, on 
page 18 of the transcript, beginning at line 30, we find 
the following language: 
Q. Did you have any discussion with Mrs. Hiri-
garay before that document was given to 
you~ 
A. I did. 
Again on page 24 of the transcript beginning at line 
17, we find the follo,ving question propounded by Mr. 
Lowe: 
Q. Now getting back to the day, I think we iden-
tified it as April 26, 1949, when that docu-
nlent was made, when you were at the Barnes 
Banking Company, do you recall what the 
conversations were at that time~ 
Again on page 25, line 1, the following question: 
Q. Do you remember other conversations at that 
time when the deed was made at the Barnes 
Bank by anyone~ 
Can the party who on direct examination opens all 
of the questions pertaining to the conversations which 
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may norrnally fall within the provisions of the Dead 
Man's Statutes, object to the same matters being inquired 
into on cross-examination~ I feel, obviously not Fur-
therrnore, where there were other witnesses present at 
the time the statements were made, it is apparent that 
the possibilities of falsification ~anish and, therefore, 
the only re~ason for excluding the testimony, would he for 
the purpose of supressing the truth, which the court in 
the ~{ansfield case expressly stated should not be toler-
ated. 
CONCLUSION 
The sole issue before this Court is the one of de-
live-ry. Was the deed delivered by the grantor to the 
grantee~ 
The lower court after reviewing the evidence and 
memorandums submitted by the counsel for the parties, 
made the following Findings of Fact: 
"That prior to the execution and delivery 
of said deed, the decedent \vas advised by the wit-
ness, J. R. Gailey, that before the deed would be 
valid, it would have to be delivered. 
"That the said Nancy E. Hirigaray executed 
said deed and then and there delivered the sa1ne 
to the defendant, \Yho then handed the s.ame to the 
witness, J. R. Gailey, for safekeeping.'' 
Fron1 said findings, the Court 1nade the follo,ving 
Conclusions of La'v: 
"That on or about April 2G, 1949, the deced-
ent, Nancy E. Hirigaray, \Yas the owner in fee 
sim.ple of the real property described above, to-
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ge.ther with the water rights, improvements and 
appurtenances thereunto belonging, and that on 
said date she executed a valid deed to s~aid prop-
erty conveying the same to her nephew, Archie 
Findlay, the defendant herein. 
"That upon the execution of said deed, the 
decedent made a valid delivery thereof to the 
defendant." 
~rhere is no evidence in the reeord which will refute 
these F,indings of Fact or give rise to any other Conclu-
sions of La,v. The Appellant's have failed to sustain the 
burden of proving non-delivery of the deed in question 
and the decision of the lower court should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
REX W. HARDY, 
WILLIAM H. KING, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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